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The focus of this thesis is to explore a new mechanism to give added incentive to invest in new 
capacities in deregulated electricity markets. There is a lot of concern in energy markets, 
regarding lack of sufficient private sector investment in new capacities to generate electricity. 
Although some markets are using mechanisms to reward these investments directly, e.g., by 
governmental subsidies for renewable sources such as wind or solar, there is not much theory to 
guide the process of setting the reward levels.  
The proposed mechanism involves a long term planning model, maximizing the social welfare 
measured as consumers’ plus producers’ surplus, by choosing new generation capacities which, 
along with still existing capacities, can meet demand.  
Much previous research in electricity capacity planning has also solved optimization models, 
usually with continuous variables only, in linear or non-linear programs. However, these 
approaches can be misleading when capacity additions must either be zero or a large size, e.g., 
the building of a nuclear reactor or a large wind farm. Therefore, this research includes binary 
variables for the building of large new facilities in the optimization problem, i.e. the model 
becomes a mixed integer linear or nonlinear program.  It is well known that, when binary 
variables are included in such a model, the resulting commodity prices may give insufficient 
incentive for private investment in the optimal new capacities.  The new mechanism is intended 
to overcome this difficulty with a capacity price in addition to the commodity price:  an auxiliary 
mathematical program calculates the minimum capacity price that is necessary to ensure that all 
firms investing in new capacities are satisfied with their profit levels. 
In order to test the applicability of this approach, the result of the suggested model is compared 
with the Ontario Integrated Power System Plan (IPSP), which recommends new generation 
capacities, based on historical data and costs of different sources of electricity generation for the 
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1 Introduction  
 Introduction of competitive electricity markets raised lots of concerns in many countries 
on reliability of these systems for providing enough generating capacity in response to demand 
growth. Crises such as the 2000-2001 California blackout are sometimes blamed on lack of 
investments in new generation, due to inefficient market mechanisms, resulting in insufficient 
revenue for new generators (Taylor & VanDoren, 2001). 
Although competitive market instruments are supposed to bring supply and demand to an 
equilibrium point, where adequate supply meets demand by providing reasonable prices for 
producers and consumers, electricity markets suffer from market imperfections which are 
attributed to unique characteristics of such markets. In a theoretical energy market, price signals 
provide not only sufficient electricity supply, but also an efficient technology mix (Joskow & 
Tirole, Retail Electricity Competition, 2005b). Unusual electricity market characteristics, causing 
the market to deviate from its equilibrium point are unpredictability of demand, lack of real time 
pricing, price volatility, inability to control the path of power flow on transmission lines, non-
storability of electricity, shortage intolerance and requirements to balance supply and demand to 
meet physical constraints such as voltage, frequency and stability (Joskow, 2006).  
In order to stabilize electricity markets, system operators set short term market rules and 
regulations which interfere with “the invisible hand of the market” (Smith, 1776) and therefore 
cause market disequilibrium. For instance, the competitive market clearing price during peak 
hours is much higher than what consumers pay in the wholesale market due to time-averaging of 
wholesale prices for consumers’ bills and also due to price caps, enforced by market regulator. 
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These price caps limit electricity prices to levels below market clearing prices in peak periods, 
when demand is high. Although generators may make positive short-run operating profits 
(Revenue minus variable cost), to make the profit in the time horizon of the plan on the 
investment in generation, they (especially peak generators) rely on very high prices (peak prices) 
that happens occasionally and therefore a price cap can have a negative impact on their survival. 
For instance, in 2001, in New England, 93% of energy supply was provided by 55% of power 
capacity and the rest of energy demand, just 7%, was supplied by 45% of available power 
capacity (IAEE, 2003). Hence, putting price limitations for that 7% of demand which is usually 
peak load could discourage new investors, since they are not going to be able to make enough 
profit during the limited hours of their operation. 
Although, this type of market mitigation policy benefits consumers by enforcing lower prices, it 
doesn’t favor suppliers since they might not recover all their capital cost and operating costs of 
generation. For instance, Table 1-1 demonstrates net energy and ancillary services revenue for a 
new combustion turbine peaking plant in the PJM market. The annualized 20-year fixed cost for 
this generator is $70,000/Mw/year; however during none of its operation years, does it make 
enough profit to recover costs and therefore this investment is considered infeasible 
(Joskow,2006).  
 
Table 1-1: Net Revenue for a New Combustion Turbine 
Source: (PJM, 2005) 
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Some advocate abolishing price caps as a solution, but even without a price cap, there can still be 
a problem of insufficient revenue, due to “lumpiness” of investment in new electric capacity   
(Scarf, 1994). Therefore, the models of this thesis do not include price caps; they focus on the 
lumpiness of investment and suggest mechanisms to overcome this problem by introducing two 
part pricing or capacity payments. 
Two part pricing mechanism encompasses two types of payments; market clearing prices and 
capacity payments. Available literature on this issue is reviewed, and a novel approach for 
calculating capacity payments is presented to overcome deficiencies of the previous proposals. 
The thesis is organized as follows:  Section 2 explains the effects of price caps on the capital cost 
recovery process of electricity generators and further elaborates the existing mechanism of 
capacity payment to mitigate the effects of price caps. Section 3 reviews literature on difficulties 
to price binary variables in mixed integer linear programs (MIPs) and methodologies to calculate 
these prices. Section 4 proposes a mixed integer nonlinear social welfare program (MINLP), and 
methodologies to calculate capacity payments based on (O’Neill et al.,2005) and (Fuller, 2008) 
proposals. Furthermore, Section 5 examines the mathematical models introduced in section 4 
based on Ontario’s integrated power system plan (IPSP) data. The thesis will be concluded by 






2 Economics of Electric Generation Expansion: The Standard View 
 This chapter further elaborates the standard view of capital cost recovery by electricity 
generators; the effect of price caps; and the existing practice of capacity payments. 
2.1 Cost Recovery 
 Investment in electricity markets is a risky business, tied up with many uncertainties, 
which complicate the decision making process of investors. In order to generate electricity in 
these markets, while assuring a minimum expected rate of return, the investor requires 
confidence in the prediction of estimates related to factors, such as: 
• Hours of operation during the year  
• Electricity prices during different load types (peak, intermediate and base) 
• Average level of fuel cost  
• Elasticity of demand  
• Weather conditions 
• Maintenance outages and system reliability 
• Labor costs 
Although there is a high level of uncertainty involved in the predicted estimate of each of the 
above factors, the decision to invest assumes that free market mechanisms will let investors 
obtain enough profit, recovering the capital and operating costs of their operation based on an 
adequate level of demand. If price is always marginal cost of the generator, e.g. a peaker, then it 




 Figure 2-1 demonstrates market clearing prices and their contribution to generators’ cost 
recovery. As shown, during base load (Demand 1), the cheaper generating facilities can make a 
little bit of short-run operating profit (Rmc1, the shaded area below P1) to recover their capital 
costs, since the market clearing price (P1) is higher than their marginal cost; however the more 
expensive and the non-active ones wouldn’t be able to make any profit. On the other hand, 
during peak load (Demand 2), due to scarcity of resources, the market clearing price (P2) 
increases, such that all facilities would be able to make a great amount of short-run operating 
profit  (area of Rc and Rmc2) to recover their capital costs.  
 
Figure 2-1: Generators’ Cost Recovery 
Base generators like nuclear and coal facilities which have high capital cost and low operating 
cost, produce electricity through the year, and therefore would be able to make enough revenue 
to recover their operating cost and a large part of their capital cost (perhaps all); however 
peaking generators have low capital cost and high operating cost and operate for a small fraction 
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of time; therefore they would be able to recover all their costs only by high market clearing 
prices occurring during peak periods.  
If some generators cannot recover their capital costs, then they will not be replaced, causing the 
maximum capacity (vertical line in Figure 2-1) to move to the left, raising the peak price P2. A 
long-run equilibrium may result in which all generators earn enough to recover their capital 
costs. 
Although high market clearing prices during peak periods are essential for peaking generators to 
survive, governmental regulations impose price caps, in order to prevent huge costs on 
consumers, forbidding new generators from recovering their costs. However, regulators use other 
instruments such as forward contracts, subsidies and capacity payments to hedge producers 
against price fluctuations and market rule changes. The next part explains capacity payments in 
more detail.  
2.2 Capacity Payments  
 Capacity payments are additional payments to producers to recover what is called 
“missing money” (Carmpton & Stoft, 2006) due to price caps. They are incentive mechanisms, 
practised in many countries to promote investment in new generation. For instance, electricity 
producers in England and Wales could earn capacity payments during peak periods until 2001, 
when this policy was cancelled by the introduction of the New Electricity Trading Arrangements 
(NETA) (Green & Newbery, 1995). Also, PJM (Pennsylvania New Jersey Maryland) wholesale 
market has recently introduced a Reliability Pricing Model (RPM) under its long term resource 
adequacy program to assure the adequate supply of energy in the future by providing additional 
payments to producers. Before RPM, this market was using another sort of capacity payment, 
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called ICAP (Installed Capacity), which was less payment in a shorter period of time (Chandley, 
2008). Other countries like Argentina, Chile and Columbia have also implemented this incentive 
mechanism.  
Although capacity payments may induce new generation, the regulator should be careful not to 
put a huge burden on consumers by very high electricity prices. Furthermore, in countries with 
imperfect electricity markets, in which some generators have excessive market power, this 
incentive mechanism might be abused; since those generators can easily exaggerate the value of 
lost load (VOLL) and therefore increase the amount of capacity payment (Chuang & Felix, 
2000).  Due to this problem, capacity payments in England market went so high that they were 
20% of total payments to generators (Green & Newbery, 1995).  
2.3 Summary 
 Capacity payments have been used to counter the effects of price caps on the ability of 
generators to recover all their capital costs. Since these cap prices reduce the prices and hence 
impact capital cost recovery for generators some policy instruments such as forward contracts 
and capacity payments have been introduced to incentivize new investments.  
In the next chapter, we review literature which suggests another reason for capacity payments: 
the “lumpiness” of investment in capacity. In mathematical terms, this means that investment in 
new capacity comes in large, discrete chunks, i.e. it is represented by integer variables other than 





3 Literature Review on Pricing of Integer Activities 
A model of a market with some discrete activities and some continuous activities is a mixed 
integer program (MIP). Prices are often extracted as dual variables when all variables are 
continuous, but a MIP model presents special difficulties. 
The classic work of interpreting dual variables in MIP programs goes back to Gomory’s and 
Baumol’s paper, looking into dual prices and their relationship with the marginal cost of adding 
indivisible sources (Gomory & Baumol, 1960). They introduced a cutting plane methodology 
(adding new constraints) in order to find a solution to a MIP program and used the dual variables 
of these constraints to price the cost of integer activities; however these extra prices are related to 
the choice of additional constraints and wouldn’t result in unique answers. Moreover, some 
integer constraints will have zero prices while they have positive prices in non-integer solutions. 
Shapley and Shubik used the dual variables of an assignment problem in a market with 
indivisible products, which modeled as a two-sided assignment game, to clear the market (Shaley 
& Shubik, 1972).  Their proposal is valid only if the linear programming relaxation solves the 
integer programming representation of the market as well (O'Neill, 2005). 
Williams extended Gomory’s and Baumol’s work by examining the mathematical and economic 
properties of LP duality and relating them to integer programming dualities (Williams, 1996). 
Proving that the dual program, proposed by Gomory and Baumol, doesn’t provide optimality, he 
introduced a more complicated dual problem, satisfying optimality; however it doesn’t satisfy 
complementarity conditions.  
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 In order to resolve missing money problem, in electricity markets, several studies in the 
literature proposed methodologies to calculate additional capacity payments while maintaining 
the market equilibrium. Scarf raised the problem of indivisibility and equilibrium prices by 
suggesting that, lots of activities involve non-convexities or indivisibilities, such as building a 
new generator, and therefore it makes it difficult to introduce equilibrium prices in such activities 
(Scarf, 1994).  
O’Neill et al. proposed a new two part pricing scheme, promising market equilibrium in markets 
with non-convexities (O'Neill, 2005). In this proposal, they introduce an auxiliary linear 
program, with additional constraints in which binary variables are set at their optimal values, 
derived from the MILP program. Interpreted in the context of electricity investments, the dual 
variables of these additional constraints are used as capacity payments, which along with 
commodity prices provide enough incentive for new investors to invest in electricity markets. 
However, this methodology has been criticized because it discriminates among investors by 
paying them different additional payments; also sometimes the dual variables of these constraints 
are negative which makes it difficult to implement in real practices; moreover since the total 
amount of payments to producers is not equal to the total amount of money collected from 
consumers, it’s not clear where the money comes from in this mechanism (Fuller,2008).  
Hogan and Ring discussed another incentive concept in electricity markets, called uplift pricing, 
which are the additional payments to producers besides market clearing prices (Hogan & Ring, 
2003). In order to reduce the burden on consumers for these extra payments, they suggested a 
minimum uplift pricing scheme while maintaining the social welfare. 
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Sen and Genc introduced “startup” prices, which are non-negative for built capacities and zero 
for others (Sen & Genc, 2008). The suggested prices follow a two part pricing scheme and they 
provided equilibrium although still allowing discrimination among producers.  
Finally, Fuller proposed a general definition of equilibrium, to price both continuous and binary 
variables in a more general form of models than social welfare maximization, to include 
nonintegrable models as well (Fuller, 2008). The ideas were applied to the short run unit 
commitment problem in (Fuller, 2009), in which the binary variables represent the on/off status 
of generators. An efficient way to calculate commodity prices and binary related prices (as 
payments in proportion to capacities) was derived by Fuller (2009) as a modification of the 
method of O’Neill et al (2005). The capacity prices are non-negative and nondiscriminatory.  
This thesis applies the approaches of (Fuller, 2008) and (Fuller, 2009) to the long run problem of 











4 The Mathematical Model   
 The proposed model is a mixed integer non-linear social welfare maximization program 
which maximizes consumers’ plus producers’ surplus. This model could be implemented by 
either a market operator or a regulator to identify the near optimal number of permits which 
could be given to potential investors, the starting time of the developments and also the amount 
of energy that could be produced by new and old capacities in order to achieve its long term 
energy supply goals and targets. 
Social welfare maximization model is preferred over other mathematical models such as 
producer’s cost minimization or profit maximization programs, since it reimburses new 
producers by not putting a huge burden on consumers and therefore maintains the market 
equilibrium. It’s important for a regulator to be confident that generators can recover the cost of 
new investments, and on the other hand it’s vital to support consumers by maintaining the energy 
price at a reasonable level. A social welfare maximization model addresses both of these critical 
planning issues.   
This chapter presents the proposed long term planning model, used to obtain capacity prices. It is 
a price responsive model with a linear demand function.  
4.1 Social Welfare 
 Social welfare consists of consumers’ and producers’ surplus. The former is a 
measurement, indicating the benefit consumers get from using the product minus the money they 
pay for that, and the latter is the difference between the amount for which a good sells and the 




In order to measure this concept, different methodologies have been suggested. Some economists 
use the utility functions of consumers and suppliers to calculate the amount of consumption and 
generation which satisfies both players. However, this approach is not practical, since it’s a very 
complicated task to find utility functions of all individuals in a market. Also, even if an 
individual’s utility functions existed, it would be impossible to compare them, because each 
person has a different scale to measure his/her happiness or utility function. Therefore we 
measure social welfare in terms of dollars, which is the amount of money that is enough for both 
generators and consumers to supply and consume.  
In order to measure this concept, the information, obtained from demand and supply curves 
could be used. The demand curve can be interpreted as a “marginal value” curve for consumers; 
thus, the integral of this curve gives total value or “benefit” to consumers. In Figure 4-1(b), the 
area underneath the demand curve, up to point Q demonstrates the total value to consumers for 
consuming the amount of Q. Consumers’ surplus (CS) could be obtained by subtracting 
expenditures (E),assuming a single price (P), from total value. On the other hand, producers’ 
surplus (PS) is a profit measure, indicated by total revenue minus variable cost (VC), which is 
the area under the marginal cost curve or the supply curve (Fraser, 2008).   
 





Knowing the producers’ and consumers’ surplus functions, each evaluated at the same quantity 
(Q), social welfare is calculated by summation of them. Competitive markets always try to 
maximize social welfare by finding the equilibrium level of production and price which is the 
point that supply and demand curves intersect. This equilibrium point has been shown as e1 in 
Figure 4-2 while indicating the generation of Q1 and equilibrium price of P1. It generates the 
consumers’ surplus of (A+B+C) and producers’ surplus of (D+E), resulting in social welfare of 
(A+B+C+D+E) .In the same figure, if output and price, paid by consumers are different, then the 
social welfare will be decreased. For instance, in case a generator produces less electricity (Q2), 
price increases to P2, and therefore the consumers’ welfare will be reduced to A. On the other 
side producers’ surplus will be B+D, which is reducing the social welfare to the area of 
(A+B+D).  
 
Figure 4-2: Social Welfare 





4.2 General Formulation (MINLP Model) 
 In contrast with the common market equilibrium models which consider just continuous 
variables (Samuelson, 1952), (Gabriel, Kiet, & Zhuang, 2005), the model of this thesis includes 
both continuous and binary variables which makes a complicated mathematical problem. 
Formulation 4-1 gives a general overview of the model. 
MINLP MODEL 
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The following sections describe the variables, objective function and constraints in more detail.  
4.2.1 Decision Variables  
 This section describes important decision variables used in the model, with symbols 
introduced one by one. For a complete list of indices, variables and parameters please refer to 
Appendix A.  





In this model, demand in period t and block s (e.g., s = base, intermediate or peak) (,-. ), 
measured in energy units of MWh, is a decision variable, responsive to price fluctuations. 
Different demand blocks could be considered in the model: for instance in the next numerical 
example, three demand blocks of Base, intermediate and peak have been examined. However, 
depending on the model purposes, more or fewer demand blocks could be used.  
The set of demand blocks ( S ) can be defined by approximating the load duration curve, which is 
obtained by rearranging the hourly load patterns during a period of time, e.g., a year or 8760 
hours, or a month or the percentage of time for which it occurs. The loads are reordered from 
chronological order to an ordering from highest to lowest.  Figure 4-3 shows three load duration 
curves (LDCs), for the month of February in Ontario, in three different years. 
 
Figure 4-3: Ontario’s Load Duration Curve 




Usually vertical or horizontal approximations of load duration curve, (Figure 4-4) are used, in 
order to fit an LDC into a linear programming model (Sherali, 1982).  
 
Figure 4-4: Vertical and Horizontal Approximation of Annual Load Duration Curve 
In the vertical approximation, the load duration curve is divided by allocating proper time 
intervals for each block. On the other hand in the horizontal one, the load is divided by assigning 
appropriate capacity for each horizontal block. The area of each strip is the demand for that 
block, in MWh. Different methods lead to different ways to define variables in a model. The 
formulations in this chapter, and the numerical example in chapter 5 use the vertical method to 
define demand variables.  
4.2.1.2 Production level decision variables  
 The decision variables /0,,-1 and /+
2,,-1 identify the level of production (in power 
units of MW) from new and existing generators in each time period t and each demand block s. 
The value of production from new capacities could be greater than zero only when the binary 




4.2.1.3 Binary decision variable 
 The binary decision variable (3,1 identifies when generator i should be built. A value of 
one means the generator should be built in the specific time period t. On the other hand, the 
binary decision variable (42,1 is used to allocate fixed variable cost for existing generator j in 
time period t, only if it is active.  
4.2.2 Objective Function 
 The proposed objective function is a social welfare function as described in section 4.1; 
however in the proposed model there are other cost terms in addition to variable cost, such as 
capital cost of construction of new facilities and fixed operating cost. Also, the model consists of 
many periods while consumers’ values and producers’ costs are simply added over all periods, 
with discounting. The supply curve of the model is a step function, with constant supply for each 
generator up to its capacity. The height of each step is the marginal variable cost of each unit and 
therefore the area under such a supply curve is the total variable cost. In order to consider fixed 
costs in producers’ cost function, we include them separately in the mathematical model.   As 
illustrated in Figure 4-5, which is a simple case of one period, one commodity, and only 
continuous variables (no binary variables), the area between demand and supply curves 
(A+B+C+D+E), which has been derived by subtracting the area underneath the supply curve (F) 
from the area underneath the linear demand curve is the social welfare for the time period that is 
illustrated. 
At equilibrium point (Eq*) in Figure 4-5, P* and Q* are the market equilibrium price and 
quantity. If any of these values change, then the social welfare will be reduced. For instance, at 
point (Eq), the market price will be P and the production level will be Q, therefore the social 




that gives a larger social welfare than the one introduced by (eq*). That’s why intersection of 
supply and demand curves is being called equilibrium point. 
 
 
If the inverse demand function is assumed to be the linear function of (4.1), then the total value 
to consumers - the area underneath - is presented by (4.2). 
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Social welfare is the total value to consumers, minus the costs incurred by producers, as given by 
the following expressions (4.3) to (4.5): 
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The first part of the objective function (4.3) is the discounted area underneath the electricity 
demand curve minus the delivery charges, paid by consumers for each period t and demand 
block s, and the next part (4.4) gives the cost of new generation, including variable cost, fuel 
cost, capital cost and fixed operating cost. The last part of this objective function (4.5) takes care 
of variable cost; fuel cost and fixed operating cost associated with existing capacities. In 
expressions (4.4) and (4.5) parameters,,,, F,, 2, and 2, are already discounted, 
and therefore no explicit discount factor is needed in the model. 
4.2.3 Constraints  
 Since the proposed model is a long term planning program, constraints which are related 
to short-term operational issues such as ramping time and minimum up and down time are not 
used.  For simplicity, issues related to the transmission system are ignored in the model. Relevant 
constraints for this model are supply, capacity and regulatory limitations. This section presents 
these relevant constraints. 
Supply Constraint: 
 Constraint (4.6) forces the amount of supply by new and old generators to be greater than 




is a price responsive variable. The produced electricity from new generators /0,,-1 and existing 
generators /+
2,,-1 are in MW, but the demand of ,,-.  is in MWh, therefore the number of 
hours in each demand block,- reconciles the units.   
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
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Capacity Constraint: 
 This constraint doesn’t allow the amount of production to be greater than the effective 
potential capacity of each generator. Effective capacity of each generator depends on its capacity 
and availability factor. Capacity factor is the ratio of a generator’s actual energy output in a 
period of time over its energy output in the same time period if it ran at nameplate power output 
all the time. For example, capacity factor of a wind turbine could be 70% which means its actual 
output is 70% of its nameplate output. On the other hand, availability factor is the amount of 
time that the generator is available for production and is not down due to maintenance or other 
unexpected problems. For instance, the availability factor of a new wind turbine could be 98%. 
The following equation illustrates the capacity constraint: 
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As shown in (4.7) the amount of production will be zero if the generator is not built until that 
time period. The same idea will be applied for existing generators in (4.8) except that they`ve 







 Constraint (4.9) is to limit the model to build each generator no more than once during 
the time horizon of the plan. This constraint has important implications about capacity payments 
which will be discussed in the next chapter. 
 3,

N 1                 M   (4.9)
Also equation (4.10) defines the binary variable of  42, , which allows the fixed operating cost 
to be equal to zero for existing capacity (j), when it is not active or has been retired. 
 8  42, L #2,         M&,  (4.10)
Regulatory Constraints:  
These types of constraints are different, depending on countries’ regulations and long term plans 
that affect their supply mix. For example, in Ontario’s Integrated Power System Plan, there is a 
requirement to increase the total installed capacity of renewable energy to 15700 MW by 2025 
(OPA, 2007). 
Other regulatory constraints such as reserve capacity (4.11) and emission limit (4.12) play an 
important role in various countries’ long term plans. The following equations demonstrate these 
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Equation (4.11) limits the amount of peak production from new and existing capacities and also 




solution of the model is associated with a lot of risk due to the generation type, for instance 
renewable energy, then the model should be run under different scenarios with a modified 
reserve margin to accommodate uncertainties. Equation (4.11) is consistent with the following 
formula which is used to calculate the reserve margin, considering the expected risk uncertainties 
(IESO, Ontario Reserve Requirements to Meet NPCC Criteria, 2007):  
* +
/%1
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Equation (4.12) limits the amount of emission caused by different types of electricity generators 
during the time horizon of the plan. In order to lessen the amount of green house gas emission, 
the parameter T
# reduced, causing the generation from coal base or gas base 
facilities to be decreased and instead wind, hydro and solar capacities to be increased.  
4.2.4 Summary of MINLP 
 To summarize, the MINLP of Formulation 4-1 has objective (4.3), (4.4), (4.5) ,and 
constraints (4.6), (4.7), (4.8), (4.9), (4.10), (4.11) and (4.12), together with non-negativity 
constraints for continuous variable and {0,1}constraints for binary variables. 
4.3 Auxiliary Nonlinear Program for Pricing 
 By solving Formulation 4-1 as detailed in (4.3) to (4.12), the time of construction, 
amount of production and electricity demand in each time period will be identified. In models 
with only continuous variables, the dual of supply constraint (4.6) is normally interpreted as the 
market clearing price (Samuelson, 1952). However, in models that include discrete variables, 
such as Formulation 4-1, it is possible for an investor to have negative profit, which is one form 




payments or reimbursement for binary activities such as building new capacities, O’Neill 
suggests using an auxiliary NLP problem in which the binary variables become continuous, but 
they are fixed at their optimal values, obtained from Formulation 4-1. The dual variables 
associated with the new equality constraints X,Y , together with the dual variables of the market 
clearing constraints, are proven to be equilibrium capacity payments for each new facility in each 
time period (O'Neill, 2005). Also, the equilibrium market clearing prices can be obtained from 
this formulation, as duals of market clearing constraints. With these capacity payments and the 
market clearing prices, each producer is content to construct new capacity and operate its units as 
indicated by the optimal solution of the MINLP of Formulation 4-1.  
In equations (4.22) and (4.21), 3,8  and 4 2,8  are the binary variables in Formulation 4-1, which 
are fixed at their optimal values in Formulation 4-2, and therefore make it an NLP model with 
just continuous variables. The objective function and all the constraints are exactly as described 
in the previous section. The only differences are the conversion of 3, and 42, from binary to 
continuous, the inclusion of equality constraints (4.21) and (4.22), and elimination of equations 
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Formulation 4-2 suggests discriminatory capacity payments to each new facility in each time 
period. However in practice it is easier to implement a non-discriminatory capacity price based 
on a generator’s available capacity in each time period. Another issue with O’Neill’s payment is 
that sometimes the dual variables of O’Neill’s equality constraints are negative, meaning that 
generators should pay consumers to be able to produce, which is hard to be practiced.  
In order to overcome the problems with O’Neill’s capacity price, this thesis suggests the 
following LP minimization formulation, which introduces non-discriminatory capacity prices, 
while avoiding negative profits for generators. In Formulation 4-3, the only decision variables 
are the capacity prices in different periods Capprt, which should be chosen to minimize the 
present worth of total capacity payments to reduce the burden on consumers and hence increase 
the consumer’s welfare. Furthermore, values of binary variables and amount of generation have 
been fixed at their near optimal values, calculated by Formulation 4-1. On the other hand, market 
clearing prices have been derived from duals of market clearing constraints in the NLP 
Formulation 4-2.Also Formulation 4-3 minimizes the present worth of all capacity payments 
which should be paid to new investors at the time of construction for providing effective 
installed capacity for the rest of the time horizon of the plan. This payment could be changed in 
each time period according to available installed capacity. Constraint (4.25) forces the model to 
calculate capacity payments, such that no loss happens to new generators.  
Although, it’s important to provide positive profit for producers, it shouldn’t impact consumers’ 
welfare, such that they have negative surplus. Constraint (4.26) takes care of this problem by 
forcing the model to have positive welfare for consumers’ while providing a reasonable amount 
of profit for producers.  It’s assumed that capacity payments are being made directly by 




of the market clearing constraint (4.16). In this formulation, capacity payments haven’t been 
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Formulation 4-3 
Formulation 4-3 pays a capacity price at the time of construction, and this could put a large 
burden on consumers, and perhaps violating constraint (4.26). In order to avoid this problem 
Formulation 4-4 has been suggested, which pays a smaller price for any capacity that exists in 




In order to apply this policy, objective function of (4.24) should be replaced by (4.28), which has 
a sum, over previous time periods during the time horizon of the plan. Since (4.28) is about 
paying capacity price to a facility that has already been built, the constraint of (4.25) should also 
be modified as (4.29). Also, in order to force the model to generate no capacity prices during the 
time periods that no generator has been built, constraint (4.31) has been added to Formulation 
4-4. This constraint equates capacity payments to zero in time periods when there is no new 
construction by defining a large number like M which makes the constraint redundant while 
there is new construction. It expresses the idea that if there is no need for new capacity in a time 
period, then there should be enough capacity for that time period. According to basic economic 
theory, the price of any good that has excess supply should be zero.  
Since Formulation 4-4 is more credible, it’s the only one which has been illustrated in the 
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5 Numerical Example (IPSP) 
 
 This section examines the proposed mathematical models in chapter 4 based on Ontario’s 
integrated power system plan data and evaluates the viability of calculated capacity prices in 
promoting energy investments in the next 20 years.  
Although Ontario currently has 31,000 MW of electricity capacity, building new generators to 
meet future demand is important for the province, since 80% of existing power facilities need to 
be refurbished or replaced by new ones over the next 10 to 15 years (Love, 2008). By phasing 
out coal fired generation in 2014 and retiring nuclear and gas plants, Ontario will just have half 
of the necessary energy to provide reliable operation for industries and residents (Electricity 
Conservation and Suplly Task Force, 2004). Figure 5-1 illustrates the importance of planning for 
new capacities for the next 20 years.  
 
Figure 5-1: IPSP Capacity Requirements 




Data used in this example replicates IPSP’s supply resources and cost estimations, however the 
demand is calculated based on the estimated demand curve for the next 20 years, which has been 
approximated by available demand elasticity forecasts. Therefore the proposed demand variable 
is price responsive and changes in each time period according to price fluctuations, while in 
IPSP, demand is forecasted based on 1.1% average annual growth rate (OPA, Load Forecast – 
IPSP Reference Energy And Demand Forecast, 2007). This increase rate is approximated by 
considering historical data, population growth, associated household activities and technological 
advances.  
Another major difference between this numerical example and IPSP is that, IPSP doesn’t 
consider different prices for different demand blocks such as peak, intermediate and base, while 
the proposed model has the capability of forecasting prices in various demand blocks, and 
therefore makes it possible to forecast demand during each demand block. 
5.1 Data  
5.1.1 Supply Mix  
 In order to satisfy demand, IPSP recommends different sources for generating electricity 
including Nuclear, gas/oil, wind and hydro. Supply requirements include existing, committed 
and planned resources. Existing resources are the ones in service as of June 2007, and committed 
resources are the ones which have signed contracts with Ontario Power Authority (OPA) and 
will be in service in future years of IPSP time horizon. Planned resources are calculated by the 
proposed mathematical model, according to the value of demand and existing resources in each 
time period. Table B-1 in Appendix B , demonstrates existing and committed resources, which 




According to IPSP, coal generators will be shut down by 2014, and will be replaced by 
renewable resources such as wind and hydro to reduce the amount of emission and therefore 
comply with Canada’s environmental protection obligations such as Kyoto protocol. 
In order to promote renewable investments, IPSP considers different mechanisms such as 
“Standard Offer Program” - SOP, which provides small generators (the ones with less than 
10MW nameplate capacity) with a fixed pricing scheme according to the type of their 
generation. The new revision of this policy is called Ontario’s Feed in Tariff program, which has 
different pricing scheme. However, this numerical example doesn’t consider FIT programs in 
order to identify new capacities; instead it assumes all new capacities follow the same payment 
mechanism, which is a two part pricing scheme, based on the proposed model in chapter 4.  
To calculate new capacities, all the potential wind and hydro sites, including large and small 
ones and also nuclear and gas projects are given to the mathematical program. The proposed 
model selects the most economical renewable sites and projects for generating electricity and 
identifies the most efficient time for constructing these facilities. Table B-2 to Table B-6 in 
appendix B demonstrate the capacities (XKi) of potential sites used in this example. XKi Values 
in appendix 0 should be multiplied by the parameters of capacity factor (Capfi) and availability 
factor (avi), as in (4.7) and (4.8) to find the effective capacities of these sites if they’d be 
constructed. Capacity factor is the ratio of actual output to the nameplate of the unit (Gipe, 
2004). It is high for controllable sources of energy such as nuclear and gas (around 90%) and low 
for intermittent sources of energy like wind (around 30%). Availability factor is a ratio, 
indicating the time duration which the unit is available to run and not down due to maintenance 




98%, than other sources like nuclear, which is around 90%.  In this numerical example, we used 
the average ratios for different sources of energy. Table B-7 illustrates these ratios.  
5.1.2 Demand Variable 
In this example demand is a decision variable, responsive to price fluctuations. In contrast, IPSP 
forecasts demand, based on 1.1% annual growth rate. Three demand blocks of peak, intermediate 
and base have been used in this example. Table 5-1 shows assumed total hours of year, allocated 
to each demand block.  
Demand block Hours 
Peak  1460 
Intermediate 2920 
Base  4380 
Table 5-1: Demand Blocks 
Deploying different demand blocks allows the model to suggest different commodity prices in 
each interval and hence introduce conservation mechanisms by price discrimination. To the 
author’s knowledge, IPSP doesn’t consider price differentiation among various demand blocks, 
instead it forecasts prices based on a “techno-vert” price scenario (OPA, Load Forecast – IPSP 
Reference Energy And Demand Forecast, 2007) in Canada’s Energy Future report(NEB, 2003), 
which represents Canada as a country with rapid technological advancements and 
environmentally friendly society. Table 5-2 illustrates IPSP’s price assumptions based on this 
scenario. 
 
Table 5-2: IPSP Electricity Price Assumptions – (2007 cents/kWh) 




Since above prices are total unit costs to consumers, including wholesale energy prices plus 
transmission and distribution fees, delivery charges could be extracted from Table 5-2 by 
deducting the known value of wholesale price in base year and assuming this value for the rest of 
the time horizon of the plan. In 2005, the wholesale price for electricity was 5.3 ¢/kWh (IESO, 
2005) and therefore the extra delivery charge was considered 5.7 ¢/KWh for intermediate 
demand block, and 6.7 ¢/KWh and 3.7 ¢/KWh for peak and base loads. This extra cost term is 
assumed to be constant for the 20 year planning horizon of IPSP.  
To estimate demand, the linear curve of (4.1) has been considered. Values of α and β are 
approximated based on values of demand elasticity, shown in Table B-8 in Appendix B. Demand 
elasticity indicates the percentage of demand change in response to 1% increase in price. As 
shown in Table B-8, price increase will affect demand more in later years of IPSP time horizon, 
because consumers have more time to switch to other sources of electricity like self-generation. 
In order to calculate elasticity of demand, the following formula is used (Perloff, 2007):  







∆t is the ratio of change in demanded electricity to the electricity price change, which is 
the inverse of the slope of inverse demand function. In (4.1), β is the price of electricity when 
there is no demand and α is the slope of inverse demand function. Knowing the value of demand 
elasticity (o), electricity price and demand, the slope of (4.1) could be easily calculated by 
formulation (5.2).  
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Table B-9 and Table B-10 illustrate price and demand assumptions used to estimate 7 by 




such as economic growth and efficiency of future technologies. Since IPSP forecasts prices for 
every five years (OPA, 2007), some plausible values have been chosen and prices for the 
remaining years have been interpolated between those chosen time periods through the time 
horizon of the plan. Due to economical and technological efficiency of new generators and 
therefore their reduced cost of generation and their effect on electricity prices a declining trend 
has been considered for these prices. Also because IPSP’s price assumptions are not based on 
different demand blocks (peak, intermidiate and offpeak), they’ve been considered as 
intermidiate prices, and therefore base and peak prices have been estimated by assuming peak 
prices of 40 $/MWh more expensive and base prices of 60 $/MWh cheaper. Demand values in 
Table B-10 are in units of energy or MWh. Please see Table B-11 in Appendix B for the value of 
α.  
Knowing the values of α, electricity price (Table B-9) and demand (Table B-10), β could be easily 
calculated by using formulation (5.3). Please refer to Table B-12 for the calculated values of β.  
: 6  5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5.1.3 Cost Assumptions  
This section demonstrates estimates of capital costs and operating costs (fixed and variable costs, 
fuels costs) which are associated with generating facilities that have been already in the market 
or can enter into Ontario’s electricity market according to IPSP, such as Nuclear plants, wind 
farms, hydroelectric plants, gas fired generators and coal plants. Uncertainties about future 
technology advancements make it very difficult to estimate costs of promising technologies like 
wind. Various studies have been done on approximating cost of entry for common technologies. 




(EIA, 2006), (US Energy Information Administration, 2006) and (California Energy 
Commission, 2003). Since information in (Navigant, Evaluation of Cost of New Entry, 2007) 
report is more relevant to Ontario’s energy market, mostly this report has been used in the 
numerical example. 
5.1.3.1 Capital Costs 
Capital cost is referred to as “the depreciation expense incurred by the difference between what 
is paid for the assets required for a particular capacity and what the assets could be resold for 
some time after purchase” (Fraser, 2008). In this numerical example it’s been assumed that the 
salvage value of each plant will be zero at the end of its life. There are different methodologies 
for calculating depreciation, including straight-line method and declining balance method. 
Moreover, some other methods try to determine depreciation rules, consistent with technological 
progress, inflation, maintenance cost patterns, user costs and other relevant factors (Baumol, 
1971).  For simplicity, the straight line depreciation method has been used in order to find the 
present worth of depreciated value of the capacity during the time horizon of IPSP (20 years) at 
the time of construction of the generator. In straight line depreciation, the facilities are 
depreciated by an equal amount each year. Formulation (5.4) shows how total present worth of 
capital cost (Ki,t) for each generator in time period ( t ) has been calculated. 
*0F is 
the total capital cost incurred at the time of construction, multiplying byu<vwQxy z, where + is its 
age at the end of its life. It allocates a fraction of total capital cost to the years of life that fall 
within the model’s time horizon, and finally the discounting rate calculates the present worth of 
the capital cost. See the values of generators’ life (agei) and their unit cost of construction 
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5.1.3.2 Operating Cost  
 Two types of operating costs have been considered for generators in IPSP, variable 
operating costs and fixed operating costs. The former includes fuel cost, labor and raw material, 
and the latter consists of maintenance and administration costs.  
In order to keep up with variable cost growth, the following formula (5.5) has been used to 
calculate the present worth of the two types of variable cost per unit of generation in each time 
period t /C~, and fuelit). Please see Table B-15 and Table B-16 for values of the parameters 
VarCost~ and growthratei for Cit and fuelit. 
54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On the other hand fixed operating costs occur as soon as the facility is constructed regardless of 
the amount of production and it’s only related to the capacity of generators. In order to 
incorporate this cost for each facility we use expression (5.6) in (4.4) of the objective function; 
Fixed OpCost~ is given in Table B-15. 




5.2 Numerical Example Model 
In order to find the near optimal values of Ontario’s supply mix and time of construction for new 
generating facilities, such as nuclear, wind and hydro, the mathematical model, introduced in 
chapter 4 has been programmed in GAMS (General Algebraic Modeling System). Please refer to 




The first part of the model is a long term (20 years) mixed integer nonlinear program given in 
Formulation 4-1, calculating the amount of production from existing generators (+
2,,-1, new 
capacities (0,,-), electricity demand in each time period (,,-. 1 and also the time of construction 
for new facilities (3,1. This model is a large scale optimization problem with 24,340 variables 
(6,069 binary variables) and 18,786 constraints. 
In addition to constraints such as, supply (4.6), capacity (4.7) & (4.8), binary (4.9) & (4.10) and 
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Above equations limit the amount of nuclear, gas, bio, wind and hydro production to 14000, 
10200, 450, 2039 and 4921 MW, during the time horizon of IPSP. 
Using the SBB (Simple Branch and Bound) solver and the NLP solver of CONOPT, following 
results, shown in Figure 5-4 to Figure 5-17 have been obtained. SBB uses the branch and bound 
algorithm, while relaxing the integrality constraints and tightening the bounds on integer 




this example is CONOPT, which is based on the outer approximation (OA) method. Figure 5-2 
shows the collaboration between SBB and NLP solver: 
 
Figure 5-2: SBB and NLP 
Source: (Bussieck & Drud, 2001)  
As shown, the relaxed MINLP model (RMINLP) will be solved by CONOPT solver, the results 
will be updated in RMINLP solution files, and then SBB solver uses these solutions to update 
nodes on the next iteration. The details of SBB algorithm are shown in Figure 5-3.   
 
Figure 5-3: SBB Algorithm 




As illustrated in Figure 5-3, the relaxed MINLP problem is solved by assuming a starting point, 
chosen randomly from the initialized node table. In case the RMINLP problem is unbounded or 
infeasible the program stops. The branch and bound process will start on non-integer answers. If 
the sub-problem non-linear programs are infeasible or have objectives worse than the best one, 
then the node will be fathomed and a new one will be selected. Otherwise, if the sub-problem has 
integer solutions, the solution will be stored and the best objective solution will be updated. 
However, if the answer is not integer, a fractional discrete variable will be selected and 2 or more 
nodes with tighter bounds will be created. This process will continue till it reaches the best 
objective function.  
Figure 5-4 demonstrates the amount of generation from existing capacities, which are less than 
the effective available capacity. Due to nuclear facilities retirement and coal fired generators shut 
down, the amount of supply from these resources will be reduced through the time horizon of the 
plan, and hence there is a vital need to construct new facilities to avoid energy shortage. 
Comparing Figure 5-1 (available existing capacity) and Figure 5-4, it’s obvious that most types 
of existing generators, including nuclear, coal and renewables are being utilized through the time 
horizon of the plan, however gas facilities are not being used that much, since they have high 
variable costs and therefore the model intends to produce electricity from other facilities or new 





Figure 5-4: Existing Facilities Production  
The proposed model chooses new generators, based on their economical efficiency, production 
capacity and policy limitations. Figure 5-6 illustrates the chronological order of new sources 
installation. Most of the new generators will be built as soon as coal generators are shut down or 
have been considered as back up sources of energy.  
According to GAMS results Figure 5-5, hydro facilities will be built in the beginning of the time 
horizon of the plan, because they are the cheapest source, overall, so due to discounting, they are 
favored to be constructed earlier. Moreover, since gas facilities are coming in lower capacities, 
they will be built right after coal plants shut down, which causes gradual decrease of energy 
supply. Also, in order to make up for nuclear plants retirement, new nuclear sources start their 
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Figure 5-5 illustrates the amount of new capacity in MW for each type of new generation. Each 
line demonstrates the cumulative nameplate (installed) capacity for each type of generation, for 
instance hydro capacities won’t be higher than 6467 MW through the time horizon of the plan. 
Also, Figure 5-6 illustrates the accumulative generation of all new facilities in each year. For 
instance the contribution of new installed capacities is 5312 MW in the beginning of the time 
horizon and 3268 MW at the end of it. Clearly new facilities have higher installed capacity at the 
end of the time horizon, to make up for supply shortage caused by retirement or shutdown of 
existing capacities.  
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Figure 5-6: New Available Capacity 
T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 T7 T8 T9 T10 T11 T12 T13 T14 T15 T16 T17 T18 T19 T20 T21
Bio 100
Wind 1134 4636 6509 7258 9268 9268 9268 12056
Gas 1201 1201 1901 2151 2701 2701 2701 2701 2701 2701 2701 2701 2701 2701 3756
Nuclear 4224 5621 7169 9368 10249 10249 10249 10249 10249 10249 10249 10249 10249















Another major result of the model is the forecasted demand for the time horizon of the plan. As 
already mentioned, demand variable/,,-. ) is price responsive, while the forecasted demand in 
IPSP follows 1.1% growth rate, based on historical factors and population growth. Figure 5-7 
demonstrates the results for average demand which is the total demand in MWh divided by total 
annual hours of 8760. As shown, demand increases in the beginning of the time horizon; 
however it will be reduced shortly after coal fired generators shut down, due to energy price 
increase, which has been caused right after constructing more expensive generators such as 
hydro and nuclear. The demand will be fluctuating slightly in later years in response to price 
variations, but still follows a steady growth especially at the end of the plan’s time horizon.  
 
Figure 5-7: Demand Forecast 
Since the demand results vary by price fluctuations and IPSP doesn’t consider price 
responsiveness in its forecast, the proposed results are very different from IPSP’s. As depicted in 






















































































Figure 5-8: IPSP Demand Forecast  
Looking at Figure 5-9, one can realize that when prices go high demand goes down and vice 
versa. For instance, when prices for different demand blocks of peak, intermediate and base 
increase in T4, demand will be reduced right at the same time period.  This will illustrate the 
value of including price-responsiveness in the model and its importance in future price forecasts 
and sensitivity analysis.  
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On the other hand, IPSP does another type of analysis in order to forecast prices by performing a 
sensitivity analysis in respect to cost of electricity to customers and comparing it with a reference 
forecast that has been introduced in a techno-vert scenario in National Energy Board (NEB) 
report(NEB, 2003). These prices haven’t been categorized based on time of use; however they 
are close to the intermediate prices, which have been proposed by the numerical example.  
 
Figure 5-10: IPSP Price Assumptions 
Source: (M.K. Jaccard and Associates, 2006) 
 Finding the values of binary variables, Formulation 4-2 has been used while fixing binary 
variables 3, and 4, at their obtained optimal values from Formulation 4-1. As discussed in 
chapter 4, dual variables of supply constraint (4.16) can be considered as market clearing price or 
commodity price, and the dual variables of constraint (4.22), based on O’Neill’s approach 
(O'Neill, 2005), could be considered as capacity payments to new generators in order to be 




Figure 5-11 clearly shows that some peak or intermediate generators like Gas and Bio will have 
negative or near zero profit, if they’d be compensated by only market clearing prices, and 
therefore won’t have any incentive to invest in energy sector. On the other hand, some generators 
like large wind sources would make enough profit to recover their capital costs; however these 
low profits may not be sufficient enough for investors, given the risks associated with electricity 
markets. 
 
Figure 5-11: PW of Profit with no Capacity Payments 
However, base generators make better profit since they always operate, during peak, 
intermediate and base periods. Figure 5-12 shows the amount of profit that base generators make 
throughout the time horizon of the plan. As shown, these generators don’t encounter any loss, 






















Figure 5-12: Base Generator's Profit with no Capacity Price 
In order to give sufficient incentives for new investments, O’Neil’s capacity payments of (X.Y 1, 
which are dependent on type of generation and time of construction has been introduced. As 
already described in last chapter, these capacity payments are dual variables of binary constraint 
(4.22), where the value of the binary variable is one. Although there are dual values for each 
generator for time periods without any construction, those dual values are not economically 
important because they represent “prices” that would be multiplied by zero valued variables, for 
zero revenue, and therefore they haven’t been considered in capacity price calculations. They 
simply show if the generators are offered by those dual values, they still won’t have enough 
incentive to construct new capacities in those periods. Figure 5-13 and Figure 5-14 shows 
suggested capacity payments for generators in Figure 5-11 and the amount of profit they will 






















Figure 5-13: Discounted O'Neil's Capacity Payments 
 
Figure 5-14: Profit with Commodity Prices and O’Neil Capacity Payments  
As illustrated in above figures those generators who were making negative profit receive the 





















time horizon. Other generators also receive additional payments; however, it is difficult to give 
an economic rationale for these payments -- they are simply the mathematical result of the 
O'Neill method.  
As mentioned in chapter 4, O’Neil’s capacity prices are discriminatory; since they discriminate 
among generators and cause some of them to have much higher profit than others. To illustrates 
payment discriminations, The following figure illustrates O’Neill’s capacity payments in 
($/MW) instead of lump-sum payments: 
 
Figure 5-15: Undiscounted O'Neill Payments Scaled as Capacity Prices 
 In order to overcome these problems, Formulation 4-4 has been proposed, which introduces a 
non-discriminatory capacity payments in each time period in which there is at least one 



































Figure 5-16: Proposed Capacity Payments 
The proposed capacity payments result in positive profits for all generators, which have been 
shown in Figure 5-17 for some selected producers.   
 






































6 Summary and Directions for Future Research  
 Mechanisms to explore new incentives for investment in the electricity sector play an 
important role in deregulated electricity markets. Since there is a lot of concern regarding lack of 
sufficient private sector investment in this area, many solutions such as “Feed in Tariff” or FIT, 
forward contracts and capacity payments have been proposed. Among these instruments, this 
thesis investigated capacity payments and developed a methodology to calculate these prices by 
introducing an MILP model that optimizes overall social welfare.  
6.1 Summary of main contributions 
6.1.1 Introduced an MINLP Social Welfare Maximization Model  
 The proposed model includes a long term MINLP social welfare program, maximizing 
consumers’ plus producers’ surplus, by choosing the amount of generation from new and 
existing facilities, time of construction and electricity demand in each period. Furthermore, the 
adequacy of commodity prices which result from the duals of market clearing constraints, have 
been examined, in order to see whether they produce market equilibrium.  
It’s valuable to include price responsiveness in the model, since its characteristics helps regulator 
in a better forecasting process. Another advantage of the proposed model is forecasting prices 
based on different demand blocks of peak, intermediate and base, while in IPSP prices have been 
forecasted regardless of time of the day. Since this model is a long term planning model, 
computational speed is not an issue. Available MINLP solvers can solve the model in less than 




6.1.2 Capacity Prices 
 Due to insufficiency of market clearing prices for producers to recover their capital cost, 
a two part pricing scheme, which pays new generators capacity payments in addition to 
commodity prices has been introduced.  
Previous research in electricity capacity planning have tried to price continuous variables; 
however there isn’t much work done on pricing binary variables like decisions on adding new 
capacities. Therefore this research included binary variables in the optimization program, based 
on Ontario’s Integrated Power System Plan (IPSP) Data.  
6.1.3 Examined O’Neill’s Approach in Calculating Capacity Prices     
 In order to calculate Capacity payments, O’Neill’s approach was examined with IPSP 
data. This approach includes an auxiliary linear or nonlinear program, with additional constraints 
in which binary variables are set at their optimal values. The dual variables of these constraints 
are being used as capacity payments, promising that these extra payments provide market 
equilibrium.  
O’Neill’s mechanism has been criticized because it discriminates among investors by paying 
them different additional payments, which makes it difficult to implement in real practice. 
6.1.4 Introduced a Novel Approach to Calculate Capacity Payments  
 To overcome deficiencies with O’Neill’s approach, an auxiliary program has been 
proposed, which calculates non-discriminatory capacity payments. The proposed model is an LP 
model, minimizing total present worth of all capacity payments while guaranteeing that the new 




Results demonstrate a strategy to compensate new producers with capacity payments for the next 
20 years while meeting the demand with new and existing suppliers. It also compensates 
producers during the time horizon of the plan regardless of the type of generator. Moreover, the 
proposed price responsive demand shows a good estimation of future demand, reflecting price 
fluctuations in the time horizon of the plan.  
6.2 Directions for Future Research 
 Following is a list of suggestions to build on this research: 
6.2.1 Extension of Model with Different Technologies 
 This research can be extended in future by incorporating technologies with continuous 
capacity additions like distributed generation. Also, the final results of the model may need to be 
modified according to different countries regulations. For instance to discourage investments in 
coal generation there could be a penalty term added to the model, decreasing the amount of 
capacity prices for that special generator.  
6.2.2 Incorporating other Policy Mechanisms like FIT 
 Moreover, this model can be used in calculating other policy instruments like Feed-In-
Tariff. Knowing the cost of new generators, the model can estimate a reasonable amount for 
premiums, in order to encourage investments in electricity markets.   
6.2.3 Exploring Mechanisms to Compensate Producers 
 Since the proposed capacity payments are paid in just a few time periods through the time 




paying producers. For instance, according to the numerical example, the generators which have 
been built in the beginning of the plan should wait for a few years, up to t10, to receive their first 
capacity price.  
In order to overcome this problem, the results of the model could be modified to have the 
capacity prices paid to producers in a form of annuity each year after their construction. 







i Set of new sources of energy (Nuclear, Gas, Bio, Wind and Hydro) 
j Set of old sources of energy (Nuclear, Gas, Coal, Renewable, Interconnection)  
t Time period (Year) 
s Set of Demand blocks (Base, Intermediate, Peak) 
Variables 
Xi,t,s Level of production from new capacities (in MW) 
Exgenj,t,s 
Level of production from existing and committed capacities (in MW) in time period t 
and demand block s 
Zi,t Binary variable, indicating build or no build decision for generator i in time period t 
Wj,t 
Binary Variable, used to allocate fixed variable cost for existing generator j in 
time period t, only if it is active 
,,-.   Demand in time period t and demand block s 
Parameters 
7,-  Slope of demand function 
:,-  Intersection of linear demand function with price axis 
-  Cost of delivery charges in demand block s 
r Interest rate  
-  Allocated hours of each demand block in a year  
,  Present worth of variable cost of generator i in time period t 
,  Present worth of fuel cost for generator I in time period t 
 F,  Present worth of capital cost of building generator I in time period t 
GH#  Present worth of fixed operating cost for generator i 
0F  Installed capacity of generator i in MW 
2,  Present worth of variable cost of existing generator j in time period t 
2,  Present worth of fuel cost for existing generator j in time period t 
GH#2  Present worth of fixed operating cost for existing generator j 
0F2  Installed capacity of existing generator j in MW 
#  Capacity factor for new generator i 
#2  Capacity factor for existing generator j 
  Availability factor for new generator i 




  Reserve margin in time period t 
T














Appendix B  
Contribution of Existing and Committed Resources in Numerical Example  
 
 
Contribution of Existing Resources Towards Resource Requirement (MW) 
Year T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 T7 T8 T9 T10 T11 
Nuclear  11419 11419 11419 9879 9879 9879 9363 9363 8050 6686 6170 
Gas/Oil 4578 4578 4578 4578 2473 2473 2308 2308 2004 1897 1691 
Renewable 6129 6129 6129 6129 6129 6129 6129 6129 6129 6129 6129 
Coal 6434 6434 6434 6434 4969 3293 3293 3293 0 0 0 
Interconnection 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 
            
Year T12 T13 T14 T15 T16 T17 T18 T19 T20 T21 
 
Nuclear  4487 2792 1911 515 515 515 515 515 515 0 
 
Gas/Oil 1236 1236 1236 1236 1105 1105 1105 1105 1105 1105 
 
Renewable 6129 6129 6129 6129 6129 6129 6129 6129 6129 6129 
 
Coal 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Interconnection 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 
 Table B-1: Contribution of Existing Resources 
 




Potential Wind Capacities 
 Potential Wind Capacities in Ontario 
           Site Lwind1 LWind2 Lwind3 Lwind4 Lwind5 Lwind6 Lwind7 Lwind8 Lwind9 Lwind10 
Capacity 48 50 109 130 162 42 200 200 41 33 
           Site Lwind11 Lwind12 Lwind13 Lwind14 Lwind15 Lwind16 Lwind17 Lwind18 Lwind19 Lwind20 
Capacity 200 85 145 172 33 40 43 50 71 200 
           Site Lwind21 Lwind22 Lwind23 Lwind24 Lwind25 Lwind26 Lwind27 Lwind28 Lwind29 Lwind30 
Capacity 100 200 85 100 152 69 177 188 192 75 
           Site Lwind31 Lwind32 Lwind33 Lwind34 Lwind35 Lwind36 Lwind37 Lwind38 Lwind39 Lwind40 
Capacity 75 79 200 60 123 36 66 72 200 125 
           Site Lwind41 Lwind42 Lwind43 Lwind44 Lwind45 Lwind46 Lwind47 Lwind48 Lwind49 Lwind50 
Capacity 155 200 200 200 200 200 200 119 54 57 
           Site Lwind51 Lwind52 Lwind53 Lwind54 Lwind55 Lwind56 Lwind57 Lwind58 Lwind59 Lwind60 
Capacity 58 100 200 200 200 200 200 66 76 78 
           Site Lwind61 Lwind62 Lwind63 Lwind64 Lwind65 Lwind66 Lwind67 Lwind68 Lwind69 Lwind70 
Capacity 200 154 179 200 200 96 200 44 59 88 
           Site Lwind71 Lwind72 Lwind73 
       
Capacity 107 163 187 
       
Table B-2: Ontario’s Potential Wind Capacity 




Potential Hydro Capacities 
 
Medium Hydro Sites in Ontario  
           Site MHydro1 MHydro2 MHydro3 MHydro4 MHydro5 MHydro6 MHydro7 MHydro8 MHydro9 MHydro10 
Capacity  1 16 58 12 13 11 126 490 18 14 
           Site MHydro11 MHydro12 MHydro13 MHydro14 MHydro15 MHydro16 MHydro17 MHydro18 MHydro19 MHydro20 
Capacity  42 17 21 28 48 36 25 12 47 12 
           Site MHydro21 MHydro22 
        
Capacity  94 16 






         
Large Hydro Sites in Ontario  
           Site LHydro1 LHydro2 LHydro3 LHydro4 LHydro5 LHydro6 LHydro7 LHydro8 LHydro9 LHydro10 
Capacity  174 131 295 140 131 135 126 490 370 106 
           Site LHydro11 LHydro12 LHydro13 LHydro14 LHydro15 
     
Capacity  485 729 1558 192 250 
     
Table B-3: Ontario’s Potential Hydro Capacities 
 
 




Potential Nuclear Facilities 
 
Nuclear Facilities  
         Site  Nuc1 Nuc2 Nuc3 Nuc4 Nuc5 Nuc6 Nuc7 Nuc8 
Capacity  516 516 2013 1548 1397 1683 1695 881 
Table B-4: Ontario’s Planned Nuclear Facilities 
 
 
Potential Gas Facilities 
 
Gas Facilities 
           Site  Gas1 Gas2 Gas3 Gas4 Gas5 Gas6 Gas7 Gas8 Gas9 Gas10 
Capacity  10 586 350 450 850 550 165 304 250 250 








Source: (OPA, IPSP, Exhibit D, Tab 6, Schedule 1, 2007)  
 




Potential Bio-Fuel Facilities 
 
Bio Facilities 
           Site  Bio1 Bio2 Bio3 Bio4 Bio5 Bio6 Bio7 Bio8 Bio9 Bio10 
Capacity  10 10 10 20 20 13 13 4 35 30 
           Site  Bio11 Bio12 Bio13 Bio14 Bio15 
     Capacity  33 30 16 48 111 
     Table B-6: Ontario’s Planned Bio Energy Facilities 
                       Source:(OPA, IPSP, Exhibit D, Tab 5, Schedule 1, Attachment 5, 2007) 
 
Capacity Factor and Availability Factor  
 
 
Capacity Factor Availability Factor  
Nuclear  0.94 0.9 
Gas 0.65 0.97 
Bio  0.8 0.85 
Wind 0.35 0.98 
Hydro  0.75 0.9 
Coal  0.89 0.95 
Table B-7: Generators’ Capacity and Availability Factors 










Demand Elasticity  
Year t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 t6 t7 t8 t9 t10 
Off-
Peak 
-0.36 -0.38 -0.39 -0.4 -0.41 -0.42 -0.42 -0.43 -0.44 -0.44 
Mid-
Peak 
-0.28 -0.29 -0.3 -0.32 -0.33 -0.34 -0.34 -0.35 -0.36 -0.36 
Peak -0.22 -0.24 -0.25 -0.28 -0.28 -0.28 -0.28 -0.29 -0.3 -0.31 
           Year t11 t12 t13 t14 t15 t16 t17 t18 t19 t20 
Off-
Peak 
-0.45 -0.46 -0.47 -0.48 -0.48 -0.49 -0.49 -0.49 -0.5 -0.5 
Mid-
Peak 
-0.37 -0.37 -0.38 -0.39 -0.39 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 -0.41 -0.41 
Peak -0.31 -0.32 -0.33 -0.34 -0.35 -0.35 -0.36 -0.36 -0.37 -0.37 
Table B-8: Demand Elasticity 
    Source: (OPA, Load Forecast - IPSP Reference Energy and Demand Forecast, 2007)* 
 
 








Electricity Price assumption ($/MWh) 
retail price t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 t6 t7 t8 t9 t10 t11 
off peak($/MWh) 65 65 63 62 61 60 58 57 56 55 54 
Mid peak ($/Mwh) 125 125 123 122 121 120 118 117 116 115 114 
Peak($/MWh) 165 165 163 162 161 160 158 157 156 155 154 
            
retail price t12 t13 t14 t15 t16 t17 t18 t19 t20 t21 
 
off peak($/MWh) 52 50 49 47 46 45 45 44 44 44 
 
Mid peak ($/Mwh) 112 110 109 107 106 105 105 104 104 104 
 
Peak($/MWh) 152 150 149 147 146 145 145 144 144 144 
 
Table B-9: Electricity Price assumptions 
Source:(OPA, Load Forecast – IPSP Reference Energy And Demand Forecast, 2007)* 
 








Demand t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 t6 t7 t8 t9 t10 t11 
off-peak 
Demand - MW 
21340 21360 21420 21500 21800 21900 22000 22100 22150 22200 22540 
off-peak 
Demand - MWh 
93469200 93556800 93819600 94170000 95484000 95922000 96360000 96798000 97017000 97236000 98725200 
mid-peak 
Demand - MW 
21450 21600 21800 22750 23800 23900 24550 24700 24950 25100 26000 
mid-peak 
Demand - MWh 
62634000 63072000 63656000 66430000 69496000 69788000 71686000 72124000 72854000 73292000 75920000 
Peak Demand - 
MW 
26986 27000 27250 27700 27900 28099 28200 28500 28900 29500 29936 
Peak Demand - 
MWh 
39399560 39420000 39785000 40442000 40734000 41024540 41172000 41610000 42194000 43070000 43706560 
            Demand t12 t13 t14 t15 t16 t17 t18 t19 t20 t21 
 
off-peak 
Demand - MW 
22700 22950 23000 23140 23180 24000 24500 24650 24800 25000 
 
off-peak 
Demand - MWh 
99426000 1.01E+08 1.01E+08 1.01E+08 1.02E+08 1.05E+08 1.07E+08 1.08E+08 1.09E+08 1.1E+08 
 
mid-peak 
Demand - MW 
26480 27000 27180 27500 27700 28000 29000 29450 30000 30500 
 
mid-peak 
Demand - MWh 
77321600 78840000 79365600 80300000 80884000 81760000 84680000 85994000 87600000 89060000 
 
Peak Demand - 
MW 
30000 31000 31500 32000 32563 33000 33677 33700 33800 34000 
 
Peak Demand - 
MWh 
43800000 45260000 45990000 46720000 47541980 48180000 49168420 49202000 49348000 49640000 
 
Table B-10 : Demand Assumptions 








Demand Curve parameter (α) in $/(MWh)^2 
 
t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 t6 t7 
α (Base) -0.0000019 -0.0000018 -0.0000017 -0.0000016 -0.0000016 -0.0000015 -0.0000014 
α (Intermediate) -0.0000071 -0.0000068 -0.0000064 -0.0000057 -0.0000053 -0.0000051 -0.0000048 
α (peak) -0.0000190 -0.0000174 -0.0000164 -0.0000143 -0.0000141 -0.0000139 -0.0000137 
        
 
t8 t9 t10 t11 t12 t13 t14 
α (Base) -0.0000014 -0.0000013 -0.0000013 -0.0000012 -0.0000011 -0.0000011 -0.0000010 
α (Intermediate) -0.0000046 -0.0000044 -0.0000044 -0.0000041 -0.0000039 -0.0000037 -0.0000035 
α (peak) -0.0000130 -0.0000123 -0.0000116 -0.0000114 -0.0000108 -0.0000100 -0.0000095 
        
 
t15 t16 t17 t18 t19 t20 t21 
α (Base) -0.0000010 -0.0000009 -0.0000009 -0.0000009 -0.0000008 -0.0000008 -0.0000008 
α (Intermediate) -0.0000034 -0.0000033 -0.0000032 -0.0000031 -0.0000029 -0.0000029 -0.0000028 
α (peak) -0.0000090 -0.0000088 -0.0000084 -0.0000082 -0.0000079 -0.0000079 -0.0000078 













Demand Curve parameter (β) 
 
t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 t6 t7 
β (Base) 245.56 236.05 224.54 217.00 209.78 202.86 196.10 
β (Intermediate) 571.43 556.03 533.00 503.25 487.67 472.94 465.06 
β (peak) 915.00 852.50 815.00 740.57 736.00 731.43 722.29 
        
 
t8 t9 t10 t11 t12 t13 t14 
β (Base) 189.56 183.27 180.00 174.00 165.04 156.38 151.08 
β (Intermediate) 451.29 438.22 434.44 422.11 414.70 399.47 388.49 
β (peak) 698.38 676.00 655.00 650.77 627.00 604.55 587.24 
        
 
t15 t16 t17 t18 t19 t20 t21 
β (Base) 144.92 139.88 136.84 136.84 132.00 132.00 132.00 
β (Intermediate) 381.36 371.00 367.50 367.50 357.66 357.66 357.66 
β (peak) 567.00 563.14 547.78 547.78 533.19 533.19 533.19 








Age of Facilities 
Facilities Nuclear Gas Bio Wind Medium Hydro Large Hydro  
Life (Yrs) 30 20 15 & 20 30 80 100 
Table B-13: Age of Facilities 
Source: (Navigant, Evaluation of Cost of New Entry, 2007) 
Generators’ Unit Capital Costs  
 





SCGT CCGT Landfill  Biomass Medium  Large   
Cost($/KWh) 2970 665 1174 2288 2096 1741 2750 2000 
Table B-14: Capital Cost Assumptions 






Generators’ Operating Costs 
 





SCGT CCGT Landfill Biomass Medium Large 
Variable 
Cost($/MWh) 
1.5 3.5 2.75 0 4 0 1.5 1.5 
Growth rate 0.03 0.05 0.05 0 0.03 0 0.015 0.015 
Fixed Operating 
Costs($/Kw) 
89 16 17 140 231 37 25 27 
Table B-15: Variable and Fixed Costs Assumptions 
Source:(Navigant, Evaluation of Cost of New Entry , 2007) 
 
Generator’s Fuel Costs  
 
 





SCGT CCGT Landfill Biomass Medium Large 
Variable 
Cost($/MWh) 
6 56 56 0 23 0 0 0 
Growth rate 0.02 0.05 0.03 0 0 0 0 0 
Table B-16: Fuel Costs Assumptions 






Appendix C: GAMS Code  
 
Set 
   I Planned generator /Nuc1*Nuc8 , 
                        Gas1*Gas10, 
                        Bio1*Bio15, 
                        LWind1*LWind73, 
                        SWind1*SWind11, 
                        SHydro1*SHydro130, 
                        MHydro1*MHydro22, 
                        LHydro1*LHydro15/ 
   Nuc(i) new Nuc capacities /Nuc1*Nuc8/ 
   Gas(i) new Gas capacities /Gas1*Gas10/ 
   Bio(i) new Bio capacities /Bio1*Bio15/ 
   Wind(i) new wind capacities /LWind1*LWind73,SWind1*SWind11/ 
   Hydro(i) new Hydro capacities 
/SHydro1*SHydro130,MHydro1*MHydro22,LHydro1*LHydro15/ 
   j Existing and committed facilities /ExCoal, ExNuc, ExGas, ExRnw, 
Intercon/ 
   t period /T1*T21/ 




**Source(Wind): IPSP D,5,1 
**Source(Hydro): IPSP D,5,1 
**Source(Nuclear): IPSP D,6,1 
**Source(Gas): IPSP D,8,1 
**Source(Bio): IPSP D,5,1 
Parameter XK(i) Capacity of planned generator i in MW 
/Nuc1 516,Nuc2 516,Nuc3 2013,Nuc4 1548,Nuc5 1397,Nuc6 1683,Nuc7 1695,Nuc8 
881, 
 
Gas1 1,Gas2 586,Gas3 350,Gas4 450,Gas5 850, 
Gas6 550, Gas7 165,Gas8 304,Gas9 250,Gas10 250, 
 
Bio1 10,Bio2 10,Bio3 10, Bio4 20, Bio5 20, Bio6 13, Bio7 13, Bio8 4, Bio9 
35, 
Bio10 30, Bio11 33, Bio12 30, Bio13 16, Bio14 48, Bio15 111, 
 
LWind1 48,LWind2 50,LWind3 109, LWind4 130, LWind5 162,LWind6 42, LWind7 
200, 
LWind8 200,LWind9 41,LWind10 33,LWind11 200,LWind12 85,LWind13 145,LWind14 
172, 
LWind15 33,LWind16 40,LWind17 43,LWind18 50,LWind19 71,LWind20 200,LWind21 
100, 
LWind22 200,LWind23 85,LWind24 100,LWind25 152,LWind26 69,LWind27 177, 





LWind35 123,LWind36 36,LWind37 66,LWind38 72,LWind39 200,LWind40 125, 
LWind41 155,LWind42 200,LWind43 200,LWind44 200,LWind45 200,LWind46 200, 
LWind47 200,LWind48 119,LWind49 54,LWind50 57,LWind51 58,LWind52 100, 
LWind53 200,LWind54 200,LWind55 200,LWind56 200,LWind57 200,LWind58 66, 
LWind59 76,LWind60 78,LWind61 200,LWind62 154,LWind63 179,LWind64 200, 
LWind65 200,LWind66 96,LWind67 200,LWind68 44,LWind69 59, 
LWind70 88,LWind71 107,LWind72 163,LWind73 187, 
 
SWind1 753,SWind2 180,SWind3 168,SWind4 59,SWind5 174,SWind6 113,SWind7 
277, 
SWind8 0,SWind9 120,SWind10 25,SWind11 919, 
 
**Hydro Info Source : Ontario Water Power Potentials, Hatch Co. 
SHydro1 6,SHydro2  1,SHydro3 1,SHydro4 4,SHydro5 10,SHydro6 10,SHydro7 3, 
SHydro8 1,SHydro9 11,SHydro10 5,SHydro12 2,SHydro13 4,SHydro15 2,SHydro16 
2, 
SHydro17 2,SHydro18 1,SHydro19 1,SHydro22 10,SHydro23 6,SHydro24 
3,SHydro25 4, 
SHydro26 7,SHydro27 5,SHydro28 2,SHydro29 2,SHydro31 9,SHydro32 3,SHydro33 
3, 
SHydro35 10,SHydro36 7,SHydro37 10,SHydro38 3,SHydro39 1,SHydro40 1, 
SHydro41 2,SHydro42 4,SHydro43 7,SHydro45 3,SHydro47 5,SHydro49 8,SHydro50 
1, 
SHydro51 4,SHydro52 2,SHydro53 7,SHydro54 4,SHydro55 10,SHydro56 
8,SHydro57 3, 
SHydro58 4,SHydro59 2,SHydro60 4,SHydro61 5,SHydro62 4,SHydro63 7,SHydro64 
5, 
SHydro65 5,SHydro66 5,SHydro67 5,SHydro68 7,SHydro69 7,SHydro70 5,SHydro71 
7, 
SHydro72 4,SHydro73 2,SHydro74 1,SHydro75 6,SHydro76 4,SHydro77 5,SHydro78 
7, 
SHydro80 5,SHydro81 5,SHydro83 2,SHydro84 2,SHydro86 7,SHydro89 2,SHydro90 
3, 
SHydro91 10,SHydro94 5,SHydro95 7,SHydro96 7,SHydro97 8,SHydro98 
9,SHydro99 10, 
SHydro109 3,SHydro116 6,SHydro117 2,SHydro118 10, 
SHydro121 9,SHydro124 2, SHydro126 2,SHydro127 2,SHydro128 2,SHydro130 3, 
 
MHydro1 1,MHydro2 16,MHydro3 58,MHydro4 12,MHydro5 13,MHydro6 11,MHydro7 
85, 
MHydro8 85,MHydro9 18,MHydro10 14,MHydro11 42,MHydro12 17,MHydro13 21, 
MHydro14 28,MHydro15 48,MHydro16 36,MHydro17 25,MHydro18 12,MHydro19 47, 
MHydro20 12,MHydro21 94,MHydro22 16, 
 
LHydro1 174,LHydro2 131,LHydro3 295,LHydro4 140,LHydro5 131,LHydro6 135, 
LHydro7 126,LHydro8 490,LHydro9 370,LHydro10 106,LHydro11 485,LHydro12 
729, 
LHydro13 1558,LHydro14 192,LHydro15 250/; 
 
**source: IPSP D-3_1 table 4 and 7 
Table excap(j,t) existing and committed generation capacities in MW 
             T1        T2        T3       T4      T5       T6       T7      
T8      T9       T10      T11      T12      T13      T14     T15     T16      




ExNuc       11419    11419     11419     9879    9879     9879     9363    
9363    8050     6686     6170     4487     2792     1911     515     515      
515      515      515      515       0 
ExGas       4578     4578      4578      4578    2473     2473     2308    
2308    2004     1897     1691     1236     1236     1236     1236    1105     
1105     1105     1105     1105     1105 
ExRnw       6129     6129      6129      6129    6129     6129     6129    
6129    6129     6129     6129     6129     6129     6129     6129    6129     
6129     6129     6129     6129     6129 
ExCoal      6434     6434      6434      6434    4969     3293     3293    
3293     0        0        0        0        0        0        0        0        
0        0        0        0        0 
Intercon    500      500       500       500     500      500      500     
500     500      500      500      500      500      500      500      500       
500     500      500      500      500 
 
**Source: IPSP D-3_1, Attachment 1 
Parameter r interest rate; 
   r = .04; 
 
**Source : S& P Assessment and NAVIGANT report 
**Gas gens are either combined cycle gas turbine or CCGT or 
**Simple cycle gas turbine or SCGT 
Parameter age(i) Accounting life of the generator 
/Nuc1*Nuc8 30, 
 Gas1*Gas10 20, 
 Bio1*Bio8 20, Bio9*Bio15 20, 
 LWind1*LWind73 30, 
 SWind1*SWind11 30, 
 SHydro1*SHydro130 75, 
 MHydro1*MHydro22 80, 
 LHydro1*LHydro15 100/; 
 
**Source: IPSP D-3-1 Attachment2, Navigant Report, 
parameter FixedOpCost(i) Fixed operating cost $ per KW per Year 
/Nuc1*Nuc8 89, 
Gas1 17,Gas2 22,Gas3 17,Gas4 17,Gas5 17,Gas6 17,Gas7 34,Gas8 34,Gas9 
17,gas10 17, 




MHydro1*MHydro22  25, 
LHydro1*LHydro15 27/; 
 
*Source: IPSP D-3-1 Attachment2, Navigant Report, 
parameter constcost(i) Construction cost in $ per kw 
/Nuc1*Nuc8 2970, 
Gas1 665,Gas2 1413,Gas3 665,Gas4 924,Gas5 665, 
Gas6 924, Gas7 1174,Gas8 1174,Gas9 924,gas10 924, 










parameter k(i,t) Coefficient of binary variable in $ ; 
k(i,t) = constcost(i)*1000* xk(i)*((20-ord(t)+1)/age(i)) / 
((1+r)**(ord(t))); 
 
*Source: IPSP D-3-1 Attachment2, Navigant Report, 
Parameter varc(i) Variable cost for each producer in $ per MWh 
/Nuc1*Nuc8 1.5, 
 Gas1 2.75,Gas2 3,Gas3 3.5,Gas4 2.75,Gas5 2.75,Gas6 3.5, 
 Gas7 3.5,Gas8 3.5,Gas9 2.75, gas10 2.75, 
 Bio1*Bio8 0, Bio9*Bio15 4, 
 LWind1*LWind73 0, 
 SWind1*SWind11 0, 
 SHydro1*SHydro130 1, 
 MHydro1*MHydro22 1.5, 
 LHydro1*LHydro15 1.5/; 
 
parameter varcgrowth(i) Annual variable cost growth for each type of 
generation 
/Nuc1*Nuc8 .03, 
 Gas1*Gas10 .05 , 
 Bio1*Bio15 0.03, 
 LWind1*LWind73 .01, 
 SWind1*SWind11 .01, 
 SHydro1*SHydro130 .015, 
 MHydro1*MHydro22 .015, 
 LHydro1*LHydro15 .015/; 
 
parameter c(i,t) PW of variable cost per unit of capacity for each gen in 
each time period in $ per MWh; 
c(i,t) = varc(i)*((1+varcgrowth(i))** (ord(t)-1))/((1+r)**ord(t)); 
 
**source : IPSP D-8 --> gas price : 8 $/MMBTU 
**source : Navigant report : Heat rate info 
**formula for fuel cost in $/mwh : gas price * heat rate ($/MMBTU * 
MMBTU/MWh) 
parameter fuel(i) fuel cost for each generator in $ per MWh 
/Nuc1*Nuc8 6, 
 Gas1 56,Gas2 56,Gas3 56,Gas4 56,Gas5 56,Gas6 56, Gas7 56,Gas8 56,Gas9 56, 
gas10 56, 
 Bio1*Bio8 0, Bio9*Bio15 23, 
 LWind1*LWind73 0, 
 SWind1*SWind11 0, 
 SHydro1*SHydro130 0, 
 MHydro1*MHydro22 0, 
 LHydro1*LHydro15 0/; 
 
parameter fuelgrowthn(i) growth rate for fuel for each new generator 
/Nuc1*Nuc8 .02, 
 Gas1*Gas10 .05 , 
 Bio1*Bio15 0.03, 




 SWind1*SWind11 0, 
 SHydro1*SHydro130 0, 
 MHydro1*MHydro22 0, 
 LHydro1*LHydro15 0/; 
 
parameter fueln(i,t) fuel cost for each new generator in $ per MWh; 
fueln(i,t)= fuel(i)*(1+fuelgrowthn(i))/((1+r)**ord(t)); 
 
Parameter varcc(j) variable cost for each generator in $ per MWh 
/ExNuc 1.5,ExGas 2.7, ExRnw .2, ExCoal .5, Intercon 5 /; 
 
parameter varccgrowth(j) annual variable cost growth for each producer 
/ExNuc .03,ExGas .05, ExRnw .03,ExCoal .01 , Intercon .02/; 
 
parameter cc(j,t) PW of variable cost per unit of capacity for each 
generator in each time period in $ per MWh; 
cc(j,t) = varcc(j)*(1+varccgrowth(j))** (ord(t)-1)/((1+r)**ord(t)); 
 
parameter FixedOpCc(j) fixed operating cost $ per KW per Year for existing 
gen 
/ExNuc 89, ExGas 17, ExRnw 30, ExCoal 10, Intercon 0 /; 
 
**source : coal price : Navigant Report, Ontario Wholesale Electricity 
Market Price Forecast, 2.5 $/MMBTU 
**source : coal gen heat rate : 10800  BTU/kwh 
parameter fuele(j) fuel cost for existing generator in $ per MWh 
/ExNuc 6,ExGas 56, ExRnw 0, ExCoal 27, Intercon 0/; 
 
parameter fuelgrowthex(j) Fuel growth rate for each new generator 
/ExNuc .02,ExGas .05, ExRnw 0, ExCoal .01, Intercon 0/; 
 
parameter fuelex(j,t) fuel cost for each old generator in $ per MWh; 
fuelex(j,t)= fuele(j)*(1+fuelgrowthex(j))/((1+r)**ord(t)); 
 
**Source: IPSP (Exhibit D-2-1, Attachment 1, Page 8) 
**based on this formula (required available capacity - forcasted peak 
demand)/forcast peak demand) 
parameter reserverate(t) reserve rate in each time period 
/T1 .175, T2 .174, T3 .172, T4 .17, T5 .16, T6 .155, T7 .15, T8 .14, T9 
.139, 
 T10 .137, T11 .14, T12 .141, T13 .142, T14 .144, T15 .14, T16 .13, T17 
.125, 
 T18 .121, T19 .12, T20 .119, T21 .119/; 
 
parameter av(i) availabity factor-portion of time that the unit is down 
for maintenance or outage 
/Nuc1*Nuc8 .9, 
 Gas1*Gas10 .97, 
 Bio1*Bio15 .85, 
 LWind1*LWind73 .98, 
 SWind1*SWind11 .98, 
 SHydro1*SHydro130 .9, 
 MHydro1*MHydro22 .9, 





parameter avv(j) availabity factor-time the unit is not down for 
maintenance outage 
/ExNuc .9,ExGas .97, ExRnw .98, ExCoal .95, Intercon 1/; 
 
parameter capf(i) capacity factor - ratio of actual output to 100% of 
capacity 
/Nuc1*Nuc8 .94, 
 Gas1*Gas10 .65, 
**Source: IPSP D-5 pg22 Att5 
 Bio1*Bio15 .8, 
**Source: IPSP D-5 pg9  Att4 
 LWind1*LWind73 .35, 
 SWind1*SWind11 .30 , 
 SHydro1*SHydro130 .75, 
 MHydro1*MHydro22 .75, 
 LHydro1*LHydro15 .75/; 
 
parameter capff(j) capacity factor for existing gen- ratio of actual 
output to 100% of capacity 
/ExNuc .9,ExGas .65, ExRnw .5, ExCoal .89, Intercon 1 /; 
 
**Hours for each status: peak 4 hr/day, interm 8 hr/day, Base 12 hr/day 
parameter h(s) number of hours for each load status during 
/Peak 1460, Intermediate 2920, Base 4380/; 
 
table b(t,s) representing beta in inverse demand function in $per(mwh)^2 
              Peak           Intermediate          Base 
T1         -0.0000190        -0.0000071        -0.0000019 
T2         -0.0000174        -0.0000068        -0.0000018 
T3         -0.0000164        -0.0000064        -0.0000017 
T4         -0.0000143        -0.0000057        -0.0000016 
T5         -0.0000141        -0.0000053        -0.0000016 
T6         -0.0000139        -0.0000051        -0.0000015 
T7         -0.0000137        -0.0000048        -0.0000014 
T8         -0.0000130        -0.0000046        -0.0000014 
T9         -0.0000123        -0.0000044        -0.0000013 
T10        -0.0000116        -0.0000044        -0.0000013 
T11        -0.0000114        -0.0000041        -0.0000012 
T12        -0.0000108        -0.0000039        -0.0000011 
T13        -0.0000100        -0.0000037        -0.0000011 
T14        -0.0000095        -0.0000035        -0.0000010 
T15        -0.0000090        -0.0000034        -0.0000010 
T16        -0.0000088        -0.0000033        -0.0000009 
T17        -0.0000084        -0.0000032        -0.0000009 
T18        -0.0000082        -0.0000031        -0.0000009 
T19        -0.0000079        -0.0000029        -0.0000008 
T20        -0.0000079        -0.0000029        -0.0000008 
T21        -0.0000078        -0.0000028        -0.0000008 
 
table a(t,s) representing alpha in inverse demand function in $ per MWh 
 
           Peak        Intermediate     Base 




T2         852.50        556.03        236.05 
T3         815.00        533.00        224.54 
T4         740.57        503.25        217.00 
T5         736.00        487.67        209.78 
T6         731.43        472.94        202.86 
T7         722.29        465.06        196.10 
T8         698.38        451.29        189.56 
T9         676.00        438.22        183.27 
T10        655.00        434.44        180.00 
T11        650.77        422.11        174.00 
T12        627.00        414.70        165.04 
T13        604.55        399.47        156.38 
T14        587.24        388.49        151.08 
T15        567.00        381.36        144.92 
T16        563.14        371.00        139.88 
T17        547.78        367.50        136.84 
T18        547.78        367.50        136.84 
T19        533.19        357.66        132.00 
T20        533.19        357.66        132.00 
T21        533.19        357.66        132.00; 
 
parameter cD(s) Cost of Delivery 
/Peak 6.7,Intermediate 5.7, Base 3.7/; 
 
**************************************************************************
***************                                             ************** 
***************               ORIGINAL PPROBLEM             **************    
***************                                             ************** 
************************************************************************** 
 
Variable Socialwelfare definition of social welfare in 1000s of units; 
 
Positive variables 
   X(i,t,s)  electricity produced by new gen in period t and status s in     
             MW 
   exgen(j,t,s) electricity produced by existing gen in t and status s in  
                MW 
   qD(t,s)   demand in period t and status s in mwh ; 
 
binary variable 
   Z(i,t)  binary var indicating building or not building a new generator 
   w(j,t)  binary var indicating active or non active gens in each period 
 
Equations 
   Objective definition of present worth of socialwelfare 
   Supply(t,s) supply constraint 
   Capacity(i,t,s)  Capacity constraint for just new facilities 
   NewFacility(i) limiting each gen to be built at most once during time  
                  horizon 
   exgenbin(j,t) Constraint that sets w equal to zero if excap is shut  
                 down 
   ExistingSupplyCap(j,t,s) capacity constraint for existing facilities 
   reserve(t) reserve capacity 




   GasMax  Max capacity of Gas generation 
   BioMax  Max capacity of Bio generation 
   WindMax Max capacity of Wind generation 
   HydroMax Max capacity of Hydro generation; 
 
Objective.. sum((t,s),(a(t,s)*qD(t,s)+(.5*b(t,s)*(qD(t,s)**2) 
            -cD(s)*qD(t,s)))/((1+r)**ord(t))) 
            -sum((i,t,s), c(i,t)*x(i,t,s)*h(s)+ fueln(i,t)*x(i,t,s)*h(s) 
            + K(i,t)* z(i,t)+ FixedOpCost(i)*1000*z(i,t)*xk(i)* 
                 (sum(tt$(ord(tt)>=ord(t)), 1/((1+r)**ord(tt))))) 
            -sum((j,t,s),cc(j,t)* exgen(j,t,s)*h(s)+FixedOpCc(j)*W(j,t) 
                 *1000*excap(j,t)*(1/((1+r)**ord(t))) 
            +fuelex(j,t)*exgen(j,t,s)*h(s))- socialwelfare*1000 =e= 0; 
Supply(t,s).. sum (i,x(i,t,s)*h(s))+sum(j,exgen(j,t,s)*h(s))-qD(t,s)=g= 0; 
Capacity(i,t,s).. x(i,t,s)-XK(i)*capf(i)*av(i) 
                         *sum(tt$(ord(tt)<=ord(t)),z(i,tt))=l=0; 
Newfacility(i)..  sum(t,z(i,t)) =l= 1; 
exgenbin(j,t).. 20000 * w(j,t)=g= excap(j,t); 
ExistingSupplyCap(j,t,s).. exgen(j,t,s)- excap(j,t)=l= 0; 
reserve(t)..   sum(i, x(i,t,'peak'))+sum(j,exgen(j,t,'peak')) 
                         + qD(t,'peak')/h('peak')*reserverate(t) 
             -sum(i,xk(i)*capf(i)*av(i)*sum(tt$(ord(tt)<=ord(t)),z(i,tt))) 







Model Capacityplanning /Objective,Supply,Capacity,Newfacility,exgenbin, 
      ExistingSupplyCap,reserve,NucMax,GasMax,BioMax,WindMax,HydroMax/; 
options iterlim = 1000000, 
        reslim = 1000000; 
Solve Capacityplanning maximizing socialwelfare using MINLP; 
 
Parameter NewNucCap(t) Available Nuc Cap During the Time Horizon of IPSP 
in MW; 
NewNucCap(t) = sum(nuc,sum(tt$(ord(tt)<=ord(t)),Z.l(Nuc,tt)*XK(Nuc))); 
$libinclude xlchart NewNucCap 
 
Parameter NewGasCap(t) Available Gas Cap During the Time Horizon of IPSP  
                       in MW; 
NewGasCap(t) = Sum(gas,sum(tt$(ord(tt)<=ord(t)),Z.l(Gas,tt)*XK(Gas))); 
$libinclude xlchart NewGasCap 
 
Parameter NewBioCap Available Bio Cap During the Time Horizon of IPSP in  
                    MW; 
NewBioCap(t) = sum(Bio,sum(tt$(ord(tt)<=ord(t)),Z.l(Bio,tt)*XK(Bio))); 
$libinclude xlchart NewBioCap 
 
Parameter NewWindCap(t) Available Wind Cap During the Time Horizon of IPSP  
                        In MW; 
NewWindCap(t) = sum(wind,sum(tt$(ord(tt)<=ord(t)),Z.l(Wind,tt)*XK(Wind))); 





Parameter NewHydroCap Available Hydro Cap During the Time Horizon of IPSP  
                      in MW; 
NewHydroCap(t)=   
        sum(Hydro,sum(tt$(ord(tt)<=ord(t)),Z.l(Hydro,tt)*XK(Hydro))); 
$libinclude xlchart NewHydroCap 
 
parameter newgen(t,i) New Generators Production in MW in Peak Load ; 
newgen(t,i) = x.l(i,t,"Peak"); 
$set charttype 52 
$libinclude xlchart newgen 
 
parameter exgenMW(t,j) Existing Generators Production in MW in Peak Load; 
exgenMW(t,j) = exgen.l(j,t,"Peak"); 
$set charttype 52 
$libinclude xlchart exgenMW 
 
Parameter qDMW(t,s) Demanded Elecricity in MW; 
qDMW(t,s)= qD.l(t,s)/h(s); 
$libinclude xlchart qDMW 
 
Parameter qDl(t,s) Demanded Elecricity in MWh; 
qDl(t,s)= qD.l(t,s); 
$libinclude xlchart qDl 
 
parameter construction(i,t) Time of Construction for New Generation i; 
construction(i,t) = z.l(i,t); 
$libinclude xlchart construction 
 
parameter marketprice(t,s) Market Clearing Price in cents per KWh 
undiscounted; 
marketprice(t,s)= -supply.m(t,s)*100* ((1+r)**ord(t)); 
 
Parameter InvDemand(t,s) Inv Demand Function or Price in cents KWh 
undiscounted; 






















***************         *********** 
***************              Fixed Binary Variable             *********** 




Zt(i,t) = Z.l(i,t); 
 
parameter wt(j,t); 





   XT(i,t,s)  electricity produced by new gen in period t and status s in  
              MW 
   exgenT(j,t,s) electricity produced by existing gen in t and status s in  
                 MW 
   qDT(t,s)   demand in period t and load s in MWh 
 
Equations 
   ObjectiveT   definition of present worth of socialwelfare 
   SupplyT(t,s) supply  constraint 
   CapacityT(i,t,s)  Capacity constraint for new facilities 
   ExistingSupplyCapT(j,t,s) capacity constraint for existing facilities 
   reserveT(t) reserve capacity; 
 
ObjectiveT..  sum((t,s),(a(t,s)*qDT(t,s)+(.5*b(t,s)*(qDT(t,s)**2))-  
              cD(s)*qDT(t,s)) 
/((1+r)**ord(t))) 
              -sum((i,t,s), c(i,t)*xT(i,t,s)*h(s)+  
               fueln(i,t)*xt(i,t,s)*h(s)+ K(i,t)* zt(i,t) 
               +FixedOpCost(i)*1000*zt(i,t) 
               *xk(i)*(sum(tt$(ord(tt)>=ord(t)), 1/((1+r)**ord(tt))))) 
               -sum((j,t,s),cc(j,t)* exgenT(j,t,s)*h(s) 
               +FixedOpCc(j)*1000*wt(j,t)*excap(j,t)*(1/((1+r)**ord(t))) 
              +fuelex(j,t)*exgent(j,t,s)*h(s))- socialwelfareT*1000 =e= 0; 
SupplyT(t,s).. sum (i, xT(i,t,s)*h(s)) 
   +sum(j,exgenT(j,t,s)*h(s))- qDT(t,s) =g= 0; 
CapacityT(i,t,s).. xT(i,t,s)- XK(i)*capf(i)*av(i) 
                                 * sum(tt$(ord(tt)<=ord(t)),Zt(i,tt))=l=0; 
ExistingSupplyCapT(j,t,s).. exgenT(j,t,s)-excap(j,t) =l= 0; 
reserveT(t)..   sum(i, xT(i,t,'peak'))+ sum(j,exgenT(j,t,'peak')) 
                +(qDT(t,'peak')/h('peak'))*reserverate(t) 
            -sum(i,xk(i)*capf(i)*av(i)*sum(tt$(ord(tt)<=ord(t)),zT(i,tt))) 
                -sum(j,excap(j,t)) =l= 0; 
 
Model CapacityplanningT   /ObjectiveT,SupplyT,CapacityT 
                          ,ExistingSupplyCapT,reserveT/; 
Solve CapacityplanningT maximizing socialwelfareT using NLP; 
 
parameter electricitypriceT(t,s) Electricty Price in Cents per KWh  




electricitypriceT(t,s) = -supplyT.m(t,s)*100*((1+r)**(ord(t))); 
$libinclude xlchart electricitypriceT 
 
Parameter InvDemandT(t,s) Inv Dem Function (Pr) in cents per KWh 
undiscounted; 
InvDemandT(t,s)= (a(t,s)+ (b(t,s)*qDT.l(t,s)))/10; 
$libinclude xlchart InvDemandT 
 
parameter profitT(i) Total PW of Profit of New Gen i With Only Commodity 
Price; 
profitT(i)= sum((t,s), -supplyT.m(t,s) * 1000* xT.l(i,t,s)*h(s)); 
 
 
parameter varcostT(i) total cost of producing elec by generator i; 
varcostT(i) = sum((t,s), c(i,t)*xT.l(i,t,s)*h(s)+ 
fueln(i,t)*xt.l(i,t,s)*h(s)); 
 
parameter capitalcostT(i) capital cost of generator i; 
capitalcostT(i) =  sum((t,s),K(i,t)* zT(i,t)+ 
FixedOpCost(i)*1000*zt(i,t)*xk(i) 
                    *(sum(tt$(ord(tt)>=ord(t)),1/((1+r)**ord(tt))))); 
 
Parameter netprofitT(i) Net Profit of New Generators with no Capacity  
                        Price; 
netprofitT(i) = profitT(i) - varcostT(i) - capitalcostT(i); 

































****************        ***************** 
****************             Oneill's Approach           *****************        
****************        ***************** 
**************************************************************************
****** 
Variable SocialwelfareO in 1000s of units; 
 
Positive variables 
   XO(i,t,s) produced electricity by new gen i during period t and load s 
in MW 
   exgenO(j,t,s) generation of existing capacity j in period t and load s 
in MW 
   qDO(t,s)   demand in period t and status s in MWh 
   Zo(i,t)   continuous var indicating building a new generator; 
 
Equations 
   ObjectiveO    definition of present worth of social welfare 
   SupplyO(t,s)  supply constraint 
   CapacityO(i,t,s)  Capacity constraint for just new facilities 
   NewFacilityO(i) limiting each gen to be built at most once during 
timehorizon 
   ExistingSupplyCapO(j,t,s) capacity constraint for existing generators 
   reserveo(t) reserve capacity 
   zOconstraint(i,t) O'Neill's Equality Constraint 
   reserveo(t) reserve capacity ; 
 
ObjectiveO.. sum ((t,s),((a(t,s)*qDo(t,s)+ 
                   (.5*b(t,s)*(qDo(t,s)**2)))-
cD(s)*qDO(t,s))/((1+r)**ord(t))) 
             -sum((i,t,s), c(i,t)*xo(i,t,s)*h(s)+ 
fueln(i,t)*xo(i,t,s)*h(s) 
                    +K(i,t)* zo(i,t)+ 
FixedOpCost(i)*1000*zo(i,t)*xo(i,t,s) 
                       *(sum(tt$(ord(tt)>=ord(t)), 1/((1+r)**ord(tt))))) 
             -sum((j,t,s),cc(j,t)* exgeno(j,t,s)*h(s) 
              +FixedOpCc(j)*1000*wt(j,t)*excap(j,t)*(1/((1+r)**ord(t))) 
              +fuelex(j,t)*exgeno(j,t,s)*h(s))- socialwelfareO*1000 =e= 0; 
SupplyO(t,s)..sum(i,xo(i,t,s)*h(s)) 
   +sum(j,exgeno(j,t,s)*h(s))-qDo(t,s)=g= 0; 
CapacityO(i,t,s).. xo(i,t,s)-XK(i)*capf(i)*av(i)* 
                   sum(tt$(ord(tt)<=ord(t)),zo(i,tt))=l=0; 
NewfacilityO(i)..  sum(t,zo(i,t)) =l= 1; 
ExistingSupplyCapO(j,t,s).. exgeno(j,t,s)-excap(j,t) =l= 0; 
reserveo(t)..   sum(i, xo(i,t,'peak'))+sum(j,exgeno(j,t,'peak')) 
                    +(qDo(t,'peak')/h('peak'))*reserverate(t) 
            -sum(i,xk(i)*capf(i)*av(i)*sum(tt$(ord(tt)<=ord(t)),zo(i,tt))) 
                -sum(j,excap(j,t)) =l= 0; 
zOconstraint(i,t).. zo(i,t) =e= z.l(i,t); 
 
Model CapacityplanningO /ObjectiveO,SupplyO,CapacityO,NewfacilityO, 
                        ExistingSupplyCapO,reserveo,zOconstraint/; 





parameter newgenMWhODiff(i,t) produced electricity from new generations in 
      MW; 
newgenMWhODiff(i,t) = xO.l(i,t,'peak')-XT.l(i,t,'peak'); 
 
parameter exgenMWODiff(j,t) produced electricity from old generations in  
     MW; 
exgenMWODiff(j,t) = exgenO.l(j,t,'peak')-exgenT.l(j,t,'peak'); 
 
Parameter qDMWhODiff(t,s) demanded elecricity in MWh; 
qDMWhODiff(t,s)= qDO.l(t,s)-qDT.l(t,s); 
 
parameter marketpriceODiff(t,s) Electricty Price O'Neil in cents per KWh  
      undiscounted; 
marketpriceODiff(t,s) = -supplyO.m(t,s)*100*((1+r)**(ord(t))) 
                         -electricitypriceT(t,s); 
 
parameter cappriceO1(i) O'Neil Cappr Summed over t not Undiscounted ; 
cappriceO1(i) = sum(t,zo.l(i,t)*zOconstraint.m(i,t)*1000); 
$libinclude xlchart cappriceO1 
 
parameter cappriceO2(i) O'Neil Cappr time of construction Undiscounted ; 
cappriceO2(i) = sum(t,zOconstraint.m(i,t)*1000); 
$libinclude xlchart cappriceO2 
 
parameter profitO(i) total profit of producing electricity in generator i  
    by selling with commodity price; 
profitO(i)= sum((t,s), -supply.m(t,s)* xo.l(i,t,s)*h(s)*1000); 
 
parameter varcostO(i) total cost of producing elec by generator i; 
varcostO(i) = sum((t,s), c(i,t)*xo.l(i,t,s)*h(s)+ 
fueln(i,t)*xo.l(i,t,s)*h(s)); 
 
parameter capitalcostO(i) capital cost of generator i; 
capitalcostO(i) =  sum((t,s),K(i,t)*            
    zo.l(i,t)+FixedOpCost(i)*1000*zo.l(i,t) 
                  *xk(i)*(sum(tt$(ord(tt)>=ord(t)), 1/((1+r)**ord(tt))))); 
 
parameter netprofitO1(i) net profit of each generator considering Oneil  
      cap price as Dual of eq constraint; 
netprofitO1(i)= ProfitO(i)-varcostO(i)-capitalcostO(i)+ cappriceO1(i); 
$libinclude xlchart netprofitO1 
 
parameter netprofitO2(i) net profit of each generator considering Oneil  
      cap price as Dual of eq constraint for all t; 
netprofitO2(i)= ProfitO(i)-varcostO(i)-capitalcostO(i)+ cappriceO2(i) ; 
$libinclude xlchart netprofitO2 
 
parameter capprOF(i) suggested cappr by Dr Fuller; 










****************        Min Capacity price                    ************    
****************             ************ 







CapacityPrice Present worth of total capacity price in dollars; 
 
Positive Variable 
capprice(t)  capacity prices; 
 
Equations 
TotalPWcapprice  define PW of all capacity prices 
profit(i)        limits all PW profits to be nonnegative 
ConsumerW(t)   Consumer wellfare in each year and each system condition 
built(t)  a constraints that forces cappr to zero when there is no 
construction; 
 
TotalPWcapprice.. sum((i,t), capprice(t)*xk(i)*capf(i)*av(i)* 
                     sum(tt$(ord(tt)<=ord(t)),Zt(i,tt))/((1+r)**(ord(t)))) 
                   - CapacityPrice=e= 0; 
profit(i).. sum(t,capprice(t)*XK(i)*av(i)*capf(i) 
                 *sum(tt$(ord(tt)<=ord(t)),Zt(i,tt))/((1+r)**(ord(t)))) 
            + netprofitT(i) =g= 0; 
ConsumerW(t).. sum(s,(((a(t,s)*qDP(t,s)+.5*b(t,s)*(qDP(t,s)**2))) 
                   +(1000*supply.m(t,s)*qDP(t,s)) 
                    -sum(i,capprice(t)*xk(i)*capf(i)*av(i) 
                         *sum(tt$(ord(tt)<=ord(t)),Zt(i,tt)))))=g=0; 
built(t).. capprice(t)- 1000000*sum(i,zt(i,t))=l=0; 
 
model cappriceP /TotalPWcapprice,profit,ConsumerW,built/; 
 
solve cappriceP using lp minimizing CapacityPrice; 
 
Parameter cappricePP(t) Proposed Capacity Price; 
cappricePP(t)= capprice.l(t); 
$libinclude xlchart cappricePP 
 
Parameter ProfitP(i) New net Profit; 
ProfitP(i) = sum(t,capprice.l(t)*xk(i)*av(i)*capf(i)* 




consumerwp(t) = sum(s,(((a(t,s)*qDP(t,s)+.5*b(t,s)*(qDP(t,s)**2))) 
                   +(1000*supply.m(t,s)*qDP(t,s)) 
                    -sum(i,capprice.l(t)*xk(i)*capf(i)*av(i) 
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